THE BULGAROPHILIA OF THE CUMANS IN THE TIMES OF THE FIRST ASENIDS OF BULGARIA*

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Abstract: Research objectives: The aim of the present paper is to examine the phenomenon of Bulgarophilia which was a recognizable pattern in the activities of the Cuman-Qipchaq tribes of the Balkans during the late 12th and first half of the 13th century. The author seeks to answer the question: what were the factors that shaped the persistent Cuman support of the newly established Second Bulgarian Empire against various adversaries, such as Byzantium, the Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Kingdom of Hungary?

Research materials: The present paper is based on various sources. The material of primary importance for the analysis of the Cuman-Qipchaq activities in the Balkans is extracted from the Byzantine chronicles as well as from the Latin and French sources for the Crusaders on the Balkans. The data for the Cumans in the Rus’ letopisi, Persian chronicles and other Islamic sources are used as comparative material. Despite their diverse nature, all these sources share one similar feature – they do not place the history of the Cuman-Qipchaqs at the center of the narrative and usually touch upon it only when the nomads were involved in the affairs of their sedentary neighbors. Thus, the picture of the Cuman-Qipchaq activities in certain regions in general (and in the Balkans in particular) is inevitably fragmented and incomplete not only on the pages of the individual chronicles, but also in the entire medieval historiographical traditions in which they are found. Therefore, in order to draw a complete analysis of the Cuman-Qipchaq presence in the Balkans, a comparative approach towards the diverse source base is adopted.

The novelty of this study: The present text is the first one to identify and define the phenomenon of Bulgarophilia demonstrated by the Cumans during their activities on the Balkans at the end of the 12th and first half of the 13th century. It is also among the first research works that put the data for the Cuman presence in the Balkans in a broad comparative perspective, using additional sources for the history of these nomads in the Pontic Steppes as well as Central Asia.

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Research results: The consistent pattern of Cuman support for the Bulgarian military activities in Southeastern Europe is not viewed as a result of a certain emotional affection of the Cuman elite, but rather as a consequence of purely objective and material considerations. Bulgrophilia is examined and interpreted in the context of the general historiographical concept for the development of a balance between the Cuman-Qipchaqs and their sedentary neighbors.

Keywords: Cumans, Qipchaqs, Second Bulgarian Empire, Balkans, Byzantium, Latin Empire of Constantinople


In the 80s of the 12th c. the Balkans witnessed a series of dramatic events that led to long-lasting political and confessional changes on the peninsula. Among the most important of them, together with the overthrow of the mighty Komnenoi dynasty (1081–1185), the outbreak of the Asenids uprising in 1185–1186 must be also pointed out. The latter event brought the restauration of the Bulgarian state in the former Byzantine province of Paristrion and along the Balkan Range, and was followed by a dynamic expansion in Thrace and Macedonia1, in the course of which the young Second Bulgarian Empire struggled to achieve leading position in Southeastern Europe at the turn of the century. As early as the summer of 1186 AD the Cumans2 joined the troops of the rebels in response to their invitation. From this moment onward the regular presence of numerous nomadic contingents in the armies of the Asenids supported the aggressive Bulgarian policy for more than two decades until c.a. 1211 AD3. Cuman detachments continued to participate in the

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1 In the present text these toponyms refer to the cotemporary geographical regions.
2 In the present paper the term Cuman-Qipchaq community is used to designate the fluid heterogeneous and polycentric tribal community which dominated the Pontic-Caspian and Kazakhstan Steppes. I will use the ethnonym Cumans to refer to the members of this community on the Balkans, as they were designated with it practically in all medieval sources in the region. When their counterparts who interacted with the Georgian Kingdom or the Khwāразmshāhs are mentioned in the text, they are designated as Qipchaqs since this was the widely used ethnonym for these nomads in the Georgian and the Islamic sources.
Bulgarian campaigns of the following decades, up to the Mongol invasion in Dasht-i Qipchāq⁴, but there is no doubt that after the first years of Tsar Boril’s reign (1207–1218) their military activity in the Balkan Peninsula started to decline due to a number of reasons [75, p. 46; 20, p. 52].

The significant importance of the Cuman support has attracted scholars’ attention for a long time. Numerous attempts have been made to estimate its precise nature and the extent of its contribution to the successful expansion of the Second Bulgarian Empire in the end of the 12th and the beginning of 13th c. Some researchers like Dmitri Rasovsky and Phaedon Malingoudis are inclined to view the presence of Cuman contingents among the Bulgarian troops as the decisive factor behind the successes of the Asenids⁵, but Genady Litavrin and cotemporary scholars, such as Plamen Pavlov and Francesco Dall’Aglio have revised this opinion. They emphasize that the Cuman detachments represented an important element among the Bulgarian troops, but the nomads were only one part of a well-functioning mechanism. Providing mainly light cavalry, the steppe allies were not able to solve on their own the military objectives the Bulgarian army faced [56, p. 457–458; 57, p. 104–106; 76, p. 14–23; see also: 74, p. 182–183; 20, p. 29–54]⁶.

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⁴ For Cumans in the Battle of Klokotnitsa (9 March 1230) see: [22, p. 161; 99, p. 269-270; 64, p. 127]; later on the nomads were still at the disposal of the Bulgarian Tsar Ivan Asen II (1218–1241) [64, p. 128]. For a slightly different translation of the passage see: [67, p. 176; I express my gratitude to the author who allowed me to use his unpublished manuscript]. With regards to the presence of Cumans in the troops of Ivan Asen II see also: [75, p. 43-44 and the sources referred there]. It must be pointed out that Cuman contingents on Bulgarian service continued to be mentioned in the sources even after the Mongol invasion in Eastern and Central Europe, see the literature in the last paragraph of the present article.

⁵ For the historiographical survey of the authors who adhere to this concept see: [76, p. 15–16]. Pavlov notes the views of K. Ireczek, F. Uspensky, V. Zlatarski, J. Ivanov and the especially definitive opinions of D. Rasovsky and Ph. Malingoudis. The latter two see in: [86, p. 203–211; 58, p. 101–105]. Other authors who follow this historiographical trend are referred to by Litavrin: [56, p. 457–458, note. 82]. Currently an adherent of the thesis for the decisive impact of the Cumans in the wars led by the Asenids (even in the Battle of Klokotnitsa) is István Vásáry [101, p. 46–47, 54–56, 62].

⁶ With regards to the armament of the Eurasian nomads in the steppe during this period see in general: [98]; for the weapons, used by the nomadic elite in the Pontic Steppes at the time of the Cuman domination see: [97, p. 103–124]. In the latter publication weapons from three famous burials of rich nomad chefs in the steppes of contemporary Ukraine are examined. Some of them can be connected to the Cumans, while other to the Black Hats. It must be pointed out, however, that in the historical introduction the author makes a number of mistakes and inaccuracies. I am indebted to Associated Professor Georgi Nikolov for bringing this publication to my attention.
If we examine the problem in the general context of the Cuman-Qipchaq relations with the sedentary neighbors, which surrounded Dasht-i Qipchaq, it could be added to the above mentioned discussion that nowhere along the vast contact zones with the so-called outside world the Cumans have been the sole reason for the ascend or decline of any sedentary society, but were rather a catalyst of the processes that developed in the society itself. The comparison with the presence of Cuman-Qipchaq allied or mercenary troops in other peripheral to the steppe countries, such as Georgia’s, the Rus’ principalities, Khwārazm’s and Hungary, clearly demonstrates that the nomads were not romantic idealists who would offer unconditional support to their sedentary “patrons”. On the contrary, if the results were unsatisfactory or the sedentary partners displayed visible signs of weakness, the Cumans would take advantage and attack them. That is why I believe that the alliance between the Bulgarians and the Cumans would not last for half a century if the nomads (with their typical opportunistic behavior towards the outside world) did not feel respect towards their partners, and at the same time did not find their own interests satisfied to a sufficient extent. Metaphorically speaking, the alliance with the Cumans was like a red-hot iron—one could handle it with iron tongs but not with a bare hand. This was the bitter experience of the Rus’ prince Roman Svyatoslavich, who in 1079 AD led Cuman detachments against his uncle Vsevolod in an attempt to gain redistribution of the thrones in the Rus’ Land, only to discover that his steppe allies reached an agreement with his adversary. Thus the campaign ended with a truce, but what is more important, on the way back the prince was killed in the steppe by his Cuman allies, and the Rus’ chronicler grimly reports: “His bones, of the son of Svyatoslav, of the grandson of Yaroslav are still lying there”.

Leaving aside these nuances in the evaluation of the Cuman support for the enterprises of the first Asenids, both Bulgarian and foreign scholars are unanimous that the nomads were indeed significant factor in the dynamic development of the Bulgarian state in the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th c. Furthermore it should be pointed out that for nearly half a century, in which the Cuman-Qipchaq

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7 See for example the account of Ibn al-Athîr for a conflict between the Georgians and their Qipchaq allies: [42, p. 248].
8 See the example pointed by Rasovsky, for Cuman “allies” who pillaged the lands of the princes who summoned them: [85, p. 118–119].
9 The relations of the Khwārazmshāhs with the Qipchaqs in general and with the members of this community in the Khwārazmian army in particular were extremely controversial. Serious conflicts appeared often, as was for example the episode of 1195, described by Juvaynî: [5, p. 34–35; 6, p. 304–305].
10 [8, p. 140–141; see also: 89, p. 554]. In the second half of the 13th century the Cumans, who settled in the kingdom, engaged into serious conflicts which led to the battle of the Höd Lake (1282). The latter event resulted into Cuman defeat and migration of part of the nomads [92, §75, p. 154–159; 71, p. 79–81; 11, p. 254–255; 67, p. 79, 100]. In this case, however, the Cumans inhabited the territory of the kingdom for a long time. When compared with the other examples of problematic behavior of Cuman allied contingents, referred here, including the account of Master Roger, this fact places the events in entirely different context.
11 Prince of Tmutarakan in the 70s of the 11th c.
12 Prince of Pereyaslav, 1054–1073; Chernigov, 1073–1078; Great Prince of Kiev, 1076–1077, 1078–1093.
13 „Сутъ кости йго и доселъ. [лежаче тамо], сібі Сьбославъ, внукъ Арославъ.” [78, col. 204; see also: 80, col. 195–196].
tribes neighbored the Second Bulgarian Empire, the sources have vaguely noted only one instance of indirect Cuman actions against the interests of the tsars in Turnovo. This is the support possibly rendered by three Cuman chiefs to the rebellious inhabitants of Vidin against Hungarian troops, advancing in the region on behalf of Tsar Borił (1207–1218). These characteristics of the Bulgarian-Cuman relations naturally brought a positive attitude towards the nomads in the works of various members of the modern Bulgarian historiography. The sympathy of some scholars is manifested in the employment of phrases such as “faithful and permanent allies” [36, p. 14], “worthy allies” [62, p. 126] etc. But the attempts to identify the reasons behind the consistent Cuman behavior in the Balkans during this period usually remain limited to the conjecture that a possible Cuman descend played a role in the regular appearance of the nomadic contingents [104, p. 427; 58, p. 83–88; 101, p. 55; 95, p. 15–16; 96, p. 155; 67, p. 168]. Only P. Pavlov goes further, seeing in the lasting and close Bulgarian-Cuman cooperation the fruits of an active steppe policy of the first tsars of the dynasty [75, p. 14, 59; 74, p. 184]. Yet, it seems that the problem requires further investigation through the Cuman perspective of the events and in the context of the available information for the interaction of this tribal community with other sedentary neighbors in the same period. This is the only way to reach an exhaustive answer to a very important question: what were the reasons behind the distinct Bulgrophilia, demonstrated by the Cumans for half a century?

The Cuman-Qipchaqs demonstrated impressive demographic potential in the given period and offered military contingents to a number of neighboring monar- chies, such as Georgia [24, p. 76–86; 28, p. 48–51], the Rus’ principalities. The events are described in a diploma of King Béla IV (1235–1270), issued in 1250 in order to confirm the privileges of the descendants of Joachim, Count of Szeben. The diploma enumerates the latter’s merits to the Hungarian Crown. See the Latin text of the source and the commentary in: [69, p. 121–134] see also a Bulgarian translation of the text, published by Nikov in: [105, p. 305] and the Latin text based on later edition of the diploma with an English translation and commentary in: [101, p. 58–59]. See also: [18, p. 80–83], where a detailed historiographical survey of the Hungarian and the Bulgarian researches on the problem by the time of the publication is given; see also: [44, p. 85–94].

The Bulgarian scholar uses the term introduced for the first time by Dmitri Rasovsky. But Rasovsky himself was not sure to what extent the large-scale partnership with the Cumans, who inhabited areas outside the Bulgarian borders, could be result of the “steppe policy” and to what degree it was due to “the spontaneous movement of the nomads themselves” [86, p. 210]. The Russian researcher also links the question of the possible Cuman origins of the Asenids with their successful relations with the steppe inhabitants. Pavlov, on the other hand, is confident in defining the massive participation of Cumans in the Bulgarian armies as result of the successful steppe policy of the first tsars from the dynasty, which is why he is pointed out as the single representative of this historiographic trend.

See for example the cases, mentioned by Vadim Kargalov: [52, p. 54]. In the chronological period under discussion, the Cuman cohabitation with the Rus’ principalities is characterized not only by the presence of Cuman auxiliary contingents in the armies of various princes, but also by direct confrontation with the steppe dwellers [52, p. 51–54; see also: 35, p. 232–235, where some instances of Rus’-Cuman confrontation from the first half of the 13th c., not mentioned by Kargalov, are referred]. It is noteworthy, that in the late 20s of the 13th c. The Laurentian Chronicle documented Cuman interference in the strife between two Mordvin princes [79, col. 451].
Khwarazm\textsuperscript{17} and Hungary [83, p. 46–47; 94, p. 294; 67, p. 56–57]. The presence of Cuman-Qipchaq troops among these states’ armies was a long-established tradition, which preceded by far the appearance of the Second Bulgarian Empire. However, during the half-century period, starting from the late 12\textsuperscript{th} c. to the early decades of the 13\textsuperscript{th} c., every one of those polities witnessed the aggressive invasions of its steppe neighbors. Often this aggression stemmed from the very same steppe allies that were invited to serve as auxiliaries\textsuperscript{18}. These manifestations of Cuman-Qipchaq military activity are in sharp contradiction with the preserved source information for the events in the Balkans in the times of the first Asenids. As already mentioned, the rebellion against Tsar Boril in Vidin is the only documented possibility for hostile Cuman behavior towards the rulers in Turnovo. It is noteworthy, however, that even if the nomads indeed supported the rebels\textsuperscript{19} in this case the steppe dwellers actually sided with the local Bulgarians against an external aggressor, who defended the interests of the central power. Naturally, it is absolutely possible that there were also other incursions in the territory of the Second Bulgarian Empire, which have not attracted the attention of the foreign chroniclers. But even if such raids were indeed carried out, they were obviously not of a scale large enough to be registered by the surrounding neighbors. This state-of-affairs places the relations between the Bulgarian elite and the dynamic nomadic groupings in a completely different perspective.

Thus, it could be argued that among the Cuman elite in the westernmost parts of Dasht-i Qipchāq there was a notable Bulgrophily. This term does not aim at claiming certain emotional affection of the Cuman chiefs toward the policies of the Bulgarian tsars. It is rather offered as definition of the consistent line of conduct displayed by the nomadic neighbors of the Second Bulgarian Empire, caused by purely objective and material considerations, as was typical for the Cuman relations with the sedentary neighbors.

As for the possibility that certain Cuman background of the Asenids allowed them to attract their potential steppe relatives, such an interpretation is undoubtedly quite possible. Yet even in this case the origins of the dynasty were not the determinative factor\textsuperscript{20}. Throughout the entire period of their dominance in Dasht-i Qipchāq, and after the beginning of the 12\textsuperscript{th} c. in particular, the Cumans were establishing marital ties with neighboring royal houses that needed the military potential of the nomads and offered in exchange easier access to the goods of the outside world\textsuperscript{21}. According to Choniates such was indeed the offer of Peter


\textsuperscript{18} See the cases referred above.

\textsuperscript{19} Because, as pointed by Vásáry, other scenarios for their presence in Moesia in the time of the Hungarian intervention are also possible [101, p. 59–60]. Yet the Hungarian scholar considers the hypothesis for Cuman support for the rebels as a more probable explanation of the events, and I agree with him.

\textsuperscript{20} As pointed out by Litavrin [57, p. 103].

\textsuperscript{21} As pointed out by Litavrin [57, p. 103].

For the consistent policy of marital alliances between various generation of the Khwarazmshāhs’ dynasty and the daughters of the neighboring Qipchaq chiefs see: [91, p. 65, 82, 213; 5, p. 109, 198; 6, p. 378, 465; 60, p. 300, 306; 61, p. 240, 254; 1, p. 252; 4, p. 215–216].

For the marriage of the Georgian King David II Aghmashenebeli (1089–1125) with the daughter of the famous Cuman-Qipchaq chief Otrok see the source text in: [14, p. 166–167; 24, p. 58].
The instances for marital alliances between the Rurikids and Cuman „princesses” are so numerous that hardly could be listed here. E.g., see: [78, col. 226, 250, 282–283, 426; 80, col. 216, 259, 659]. The Cuman-Qipchaqs continued to follow the same policy to marry their daughters for sedentary rulers with whom they desired to form a partnership even after the beginning of the Mongol invasion in Dāshi-i Qipchāq, when huge masses of nomads were pushed into the territories of the sedentary states. Such for example was the case of the Amir of Ganja Kūshkhara’s marriage with a daughter of one of the Qipchaq chiefs, who were looking for asylum in his domains in the early 20s of the 13th c. [43, p. 259]. Three Cuman „princesses” married prominent nobles of the Latin Empire of Constantinople during the short-lived alliance of one Cuman grouping with the Crusaders in the very beginning of the 40s of the same century [73, p. 38–39; the original passage of Albericus quoted in: 101, p. 66, note 42]. Not surprisingly, the second settlement of the Cumans in Hungary, soon after the retreat of the Mongols, was followed by a dynastic marriage of the heir and future king Stephen V (1270–1272) with the daughter of a Cuman chief, known in the sources under her Christian name Elizabeth [11, p. 88, note 56, 261, note 197; 12, p. 106–107; 67, p. 71].

22 [22, p. 156; see also the evidence of Theodorus Scutariota, 99, p. 266]. Robert de Clari noted the close relations between Kaloyan and the Cumans, but did not mention a marriage. It must be taken into consideration, however, that in this passage the French Knight may have mixed the image of Kaloyan with those of his older brother Asen, [87, p. §LXV, p. 104–105].

23 Typical in this regard is the wedding of Svyatopolk II (Prince of Polock, 1069–1071; Novgorod, 1078–1088; Turov, 1088–1093; Great Prince of Kiev, 1093–1113) with the daughter of the Cuman chief Tugorkan. The marriage, mentioned in the chronicles s.a. 1095, was part of the peace agreement which followed the unsuccessful for the Rus’ war with the nomads, provoked by the prince, [78, col. 226; 80, col. 216]. It should be pointed out, however, that the wedding did not lead to lasting peace since in 1096 Tugorkan again attacked the Rus’ lands and after facing the armies of Svyatopolk and Vladimir Monomach (Prince of Smolensk, 1073–1078; Chernigov, 1078–1094; Pereyaslavl, 1094–1113; Great Prince of Kiev, 1113–1125) suffered a crushing defeat in the course of which the chief and his son perished. The family obligations of Svyatopolk were limited to the arrangement of a proper funeral for his “father in law and enemy”: „на заузърье же изълъшоа Тугоркана мертвого. и взыша и Святиполкъ. акы тъста своего и врага. [и] привезше и г Къвъву. погребоша и на Берестовъмъ. межо путемъ идущими на Берестово. и друзьямъ в манастъри идущемъ” [78, col. 231–232; 80, col. 221–222]. The aforementioned marriage of the Amir of Ganja Kūshkhara with the daughter of one of the Qipchaq chiefs, who sought asylum in his lands, represents another example, this time from the region of Transcaucasia. Soon after the wedding, the newly arrived Qipchaqs became
posite. Thus a marriage with Cuman chief’s daughter should be viewed rather as a sign for the cooperation with the nomads instead as a reason for it\textsuperscript{24}. In the end, it is possible for the traditional ties of certain sedentary dynasty with particular Cuman clans to undergo a twist, leading to conflict between them, as happened for example with the Olgovichi from Chernigov and their relatives from the groupings of the Wild Cumans\textsuperscript{25}. That is why I believe that the possibility for the Cuman origins of (part of) the Asenids’ forefathers is not definitive for the nature of their relations with the nomads. If there was a mutual interest, kinship could be established or strengthen, but if such an interest was not present, nothing could stop the nomads to withdraw from the cooperation.

The habit of particular Cuman clans to form traditional allied ties with neighboring dynasties was quite often not related to the latter’s origins. Yet, such ties frequently led to marital connections between steppe and sown as happened with the Asenids themselves, after Kaloyan took as a wife a noble Cuman woman, who later remarried his nephew Boril\textsuperscript{26}. Therefore, the stability of the allied relations was defined not by the origins of the dynasty or its kinship ties with the nomads, but rather by the access it provided to the outside world and its policies with regards to the steppe allies. At the very moment, in which the interests of the latter were violated, a tension or even a conflict could easily have appeared.

It is precisely in this context that the explanation for the Cuman Bulgarophily should be searched and I would like to bring attention upon several distinct factors that affected the profile of relations between the Balkan contact zone and the Euras-

\textsuperscript{24} Aside of the material benefits, another important stimulus for the establishment of marital ties with the neighboring sedentary dynasties, was the prestige that such marriages with powerful representatives of the outside world had in the eyes of the steppe dwellers.

\textsuperscript{25} For example the aggressive campaigns of Olgovichi against the Cuman camps in 1185 [79, col. 397–398; 80, col. 637–644, also commented in note 23] and in 1191 [80, col. 673]; see also: [29, p. 308–309]; Golden also brings attention to the more aggressive attitude of the princes from the Chernigov land towards the Cumans in the last quarter of the 12th c., but points out that they prefer to act mainly—thought not exclusively—against the Non-Wild Cumans. Yet while we cannot identify precisely the nomadic adversaries of the Olgovichi in 1191 the campaign of 1185 undoubtedly represents an example for conflict with the Wild Cumans, since Konchak stood out among the chiefs of the nomadic coalition. Apropos, the clash from 1185 and its aftermath also demonstrate that even if conflict flared up, this does not necessarily mean the end of the traditional ties between Olgovichi and the Wild Cumans since about two years after he was captured at Kayala Igor’s son Vladimir come back from the steppe with his new Cuman wife, who belonged to the family of Konchak—“Конъчаковник” [80, col. 659].
sian steppe in the end of 12th and the first half of the 13th c. The already mentioned feeling of respect that the Asenids were able to evoke among the Cumans, combined with rich opportunities for incursions into the outside world is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the establishment of lasting and consistent cooperation with the nomads. No doubt, the control, established by the Asenids upon the territory along the right bank of the Lower Danube and the Balkan Range should be pointed out among the decisive factors for such a fruitful partnership. This area lied on the way towards the Byzantine provinces in Thrace. The potential of the Bulgarian state to cut off the access towards the southern fields (even at the cost of incursions on the northern site of the Balkan mountain), combined with the promising perspectives for participation in the anti-Byzantine campaigns of the Asenids undoubtedly influenced the orientation of the nomads to a great extent. Another key aspect is the Second Bulgarian Empire’s establishment in the end of the 12th c., when the Cumans had already developed sustainable model of lasting allied relations with the neighboring sedentary dynasties. The emergence of the Second Bulgarian State came long after the initial “heroic age” of the Cuman aggression against almost all settled neighbors—that significantly affected the Bulgarian lands too—had already gone. Thus, the Asenids offered yet another opportunity for application of the well-functioning model of alliance with a local partner—a very attractive one indeed. In fact Niketas Choniates, intentionally or not, described precisely this state of affairs, relating to Peter’s talks with the Cumans:

That is why he [Peter] assigns a reward (which was very convenient for the perceptions of the barbarians and was very pleasant for them), [namely] that they would irrig without efforts through the valleys of Haemus, and the Iron Gates too were open, they would go unhindered also through the Long Wall and through this narrow and impassable pass they would go out on open space and would devastate the lands of my Emperor, and would afterwards torn apart with their swords the bundles of the Romans and would plunder their possessions, without giving to the one who shows them the way from the fruit and without paying a reward... [66, p. 95]

27 Of course, when the Asenids turned for first time to the Cumans for help they were definitely not in a position of respectable sedentary rulers, who could display power and status. In this regard they were not significantly different from a number of other political figures, who sought asylum or help from the Cumans, such as the unfortunate Roman Svyatoslavich [78, col. 204; see also: 80, col. 195–196], Pseudo-Diogenes, [7, p. 102–103] Yuri Andreevich (Prince of Novgorod, 1172–1175; husband and co-ruler of the Georgian Queen Tamar, 1185–1188) [28, p. 50], etc. The Cuman-Qipchaqs eagerly accepted and supported representatives of the neighboring sedentary political elites, who fell into troubles back home or were prone to adventures. The nomads did not trouble themselves too much with regards to their real status and potential and were happy to use the opportunities for raids in the sedentary territories. But if the first Asenids were not able to impose their authority in the course of their ascending political activities, the consistent partnership with the nomads in the following decades and even more so, the authoritarian actions of Asen (1185/1186–1196), who took away the captured Sebastocrator Isaac from the Cuman who caught him, as well as the ceding of other eminent captives like Baldwin I (1204–1205) and Constantine Tornikios to Kaloyan would have been impossible, [75, p. 29, 33–34; 74, p. 183].

28 Landsnahme in the words of Peter Golden [23, p. 99–100; see also: 27, p. 79; 28, p. 41].

29 The English quotation follows the Bulgarian translation.
It is not by chance that, according to the Byzantine chronicler, the Cumans “met like an unexpected find the proposals of the rebel and rushed like herds and spring bees” [66, p. 95].

The geographical features of the contact zone between South-Eastern Europe and the Eurasian Steppe also should not be neglected. Its specifics were the main reason for the peculiar position of the Balkans in the typology of Cuman relations with the surrounding outside world. The access to the Wallachian Plain and the territories south of the Danube passed through a relatively narrow steppe zone between the Carpathian Range and the North Western coast of the Black Sea. It seems that the Wallachian Plain was not sufficient basis that would be able to maintain a significant Cuman grouping. That is why the societies in the Balkan North East interacted with the nomads through a quite narrow steppe frontier which was perhaps controlled by one or two grouping during most of the period of Cuman-Qipchaq domination in the region. In any event their number was significantly smaller than that of the tribes, which neighbored sedentary societies with a vast steppe frontier, like the Rus’ principalities or Khwārazm. Under the influence of the dynamic processes in the steppe inland particular nomadic grouping or groupings that inhabited this westernmost part of Dasht-i Qipchāq could be replaced. But this limited space simply could not support many groupings for a long time, so eventually only one or two steppe groupings remained direct neighbors of the Balkan societies, thus controlling the access of the other nomads to this zone.

31 The English quotation follows the Bulgarian translation. Regarding these negotiations see also the comment in: [76, p. 23].
32 More details see in: [33, p. 142–151].
33 Such an observation is supported also by the location of the burial assemblages, related to the Cumans. Victor Spinei points out that their concentration is particularly intensive along the Dniester and Prut rivers and more dispersed between Prut and Siret. According to the Romanian scholar: “There are few burial assemblages to the west of the river Siret, and virtually none to the west of the Olt River” [93, p. 437–439]; see also a much earlier map of burials that are related to the Cumans, which contains significantly lesser number of sites: [21, p. 15].
34 The grouping or the groupings that controlled the access to the Balkans and the Wallachian Plain were composed by various clans, since this was characteristic for the socio-political structure of the Eurasian nomads [35, p. 145–162; 34].
35 This model is applicable only for the periods of relative peace in the Pontic steppes when the nomads were not subjected to the attacks of an aggressive steppe invader. Otherwise a number of steppe groupings could concentrate in the plains north of the lower course of the Danube and its delta in the search of refuge, as apparently have been the cases with the Pechenegs and the Uzes in the 11th c. [59, p. 166, 175–178; 90, p. 312–314, 331–333; see also: 50, p. 197–198, 200–201]. But in the age of the Cuman-Qipchaq domination in Dasht-i Qipchāq there is no evidence for such dramatic concentration of nomads in the region until the Mongol invasion, despite the fact that some Rus’ campaigns apparently caused certain reconfiguration in the Pontic Steppes (for example the migration of Otrok in Georgia, for the latter see more details in: 24, p. 45–87 and in particular p. 57–76; 28, p. 46–48; 63, p. 40–54, and the sources, quoted in this publications]. The Hypatian Chronicle notes s.a. 1106 that the Rus’ pursued some Cumans to the Danube, but does not mention concentration of nomadic camps in the region [80, col. 257], apropos, in the almost identical account of the Laurenthian Chronicle the detail that the pursuit reached the Danube is absent, 78, col. 281. S.a. 1159. the Hypatian Chronicle reports that numerous Cumans supported the Rus’ prince Ivan Berladnik (Prince of Zvenigorod, 1128–1144; Prince of Galicia, 1144) in his activities in the area of “the Danube towns” [80, col. 497]. But the chronicler’s comment that before the campaign the prince attracted his steppe allies after he visited them “in the field” does not help much for the localization of their habitats and we
This fact spared the Assenids the numerous difficulties that the Rus’ princes were forced to face on their vast contact zone with many tribes, where reaching an agreement with one of them did not guarantee peace with the others. That is why the establishment of traditional ties with the closest steppe grouping, which controlled the access of the others to the territory of the Bulgarian state, undoubtedly brought certain stabilization of the relations with the Cumans. At the same time, if

cannot go beyond the general assumption that they lied somewhere on the North Western coasts of the Black Sea. The same is also valid for the second wave of Cumans, who gathered around the prince in the course of the campaign. That is why I believe that this account does not provide us with sufficient grounds for the identification of the Cumans mentioned in it, as inhabitants of “the regions along the Danube” as considered by Rasovsky [84, p. 158]. In 1114 the Cumans crossed the Danube near Vidin, started to ravage the Byzantine holdings in the region and withdraw only when they learned that Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) is approaching. The basileus sent a detachment that crossed “Istros” and pursued the nomads for three days. The Byzantines gave up the chase only when the Cumans crossed by rafts some river, which flowed beyond the Danube [7, p. 135, 138–139]. In an undated letter of Theophylact of Ohrid to the Bishop of Vidin the complains of the latter that the lands under his spiritual jurisdiction are subjected to Cuman incursions are commented, but the rhetoric style of the source does not allow us to extract additional information regarding the context of this short evidence [100, p. 141]. The Account of Anna Komnena leaves the impression that the Cumans who raided the region of Vidin did not inhabit the trans-Danubian territories that immediately neighbored these lands and only marched through them. Similar picture is revealed by the Cuman incursion in the Paristrion in 1148, when once again the news for the approaching Emperor—this time Manuel I Komnenos (1143–1180), gave a signal for the Cuman retreat beyond the Danube. According to Kinnamos the Basileus personally led a detachment in pursuit of the attackers, chased them as far as the environs of “Tauroscythia” (i.e. Southern Rus’) and managed to impose a battle to the retreating nomads, which they eventually lost, [48, p. 226–228; 65, p. 11; 99, p. 226–227; see also the additional sources and the analysis in: 13, p. 17–22]. The fact that there is no mention of Cuman camps in Kinnamos’ description of the pursuit through the lands north of the Danube, and that the attackers were apparently withdrawing with their booty and captives beyond these areas, allowed the Russian researcher Igor Knyazki to assume that in the Wallachian Plain there were no Cuman encampments and that the Cumans were retreating towards their distant habitats [53, p. 127–128]. On the other hand, according to Bibikov, the military theater of the war of 1148 was of a relatively limited scale. Thus we cannot be sure whether Knyazki’s conclusion could be valid for the entire Wallachian Plain. As a matter of fact, the question for the precise chronology of the Cuman penetration in this region is quite unclear and is touched by a number of scholars, see historiographical survey and analysis of the problem in: [35, p. 127–130]. I assume, that the quoted sources and the general historical context in the region in 12th – first half of the 13th c. allow two main conclusions, directly related to the present topic, to be drawn. Firstly, that the Cumans undoubtedly imposed themselves as a dominant political factor in the Wallachian Plain during the period of their hegemony in Dasht-i Qipchâq, but the sources do not permit us to establish when exactly this happened. Secondly, there was apparently no distinct powerful Cuman grouping until the beginning of the Mongol invasion in the Cuman Steppe in the Wallachian Plain.

A typical example is the episode in the Rus’-Cuman Relations that took place at the turn of the seventh decade of the 12th c. Then the Great Prince of Kiev Gleb Yurievich was forced to lead parallel negotiations with the steppe chiefs on both sites of Dnieper. The talks eventually ended with incursions by the right bank grouping, unsatisfied by the fact that it was left to wait for the results of the parley between the left bank nomads and the prince (for this see the account for the events s.a. 1169 in: [79, col. 357–361]; and s.a. 1172 in: [80, col. 555–559]). On another occasion similar negotiations of the Rus’ princes with the left and right bank Cumans in 1193 also ended with a failure [80, col. 675–676]. These events were already examined by Omeljan Pritsak [81, p. 1615–1623].
a need arised, this partner grouping could serve as a mediator and facilitate the attraction of additional military contingents from its eastern neighbors.

On the other hand, the possible support of the Cumans for the Vidin rebellion and their potential participation in the return of Ivan Asen II may indicate that the nomads were interested in joining factional strife south of the Danube. But there the opportunities for them were much more limited as compared to the situation in the Rus’ principalities, which were always close at hand. Furthermore, the majority of the renegades and separatists were orientated in this period towards cooperation with the southern, south-western or western neighbors of Bulgaria, as illustrated by the careers of Ivanko, Alexius Slav and Strez [68].

Thus, the Bulgarophily is not simply a result of the undoubtedly successful “steppe policy” of the first Asenids and the established lasting relations with the Cuman elite. This phenomenon is to a much more significant extend a product of the Cuman adaptation to Dasht-i Qipchāq and the establishment of lasting models of mutually profitable relations with the neighboring sedentary societies. Its development was further facilitated by the specific geographical location of the contact zone between the Balkans and the steppe. It was these circumstances that made the application of any steppe policy whatsoever possible. The Cumans reached similar state of balance, but of a much larger scale, in their relations with the Rus’ princes too. In this case, however, part of the exchange was conducted through mutual raids37. Such activities on the Balkans were not justified neither by the Bulgarian, nor by the Cuman interests in the region.

Similarly to many other places on the vast contact zone between the Cumans and the outside world, where the balance nourished long-lasting mutually profitable models of interaction with the bordering sedentary states, the Bulgarophily existed as long as the balance existed. When the Mongol invasion in Dasht-i Qipchāq brought the political collapse of the Cuman-Qipchaq tribal community, the long-lasting relations with the neighboring societies were whipped out, and the Cuman Bulgarophily came to an end. Even though in the years after the Mongol onslaught Michael II Asen (1246–1256) could attract Cuman allies from beyond the Danube, where they were still able to find some modus vivendi with the newly established Golden Horde [72, p. 192–193; 74, p. 180; 73, p. 42], large masses of refugees from Dasht-i Qipchāq already wandered around the Balkans and switched their loyalty between the Latins and the Nicaeans. Thus, the Cuman auxiliaries from the steppes were not anymore Asenids’ monopoly.

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БОЛГАРОФИЛИЯ КУМАНОВ В ПЕРИОД ПРАВЛЕНИЯ ПЕРВЫХ АСЕНИДОВ В БОЛГАРИИ

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Цель исследования: целью настоящей статьи является рассмотрение феномена болгарофилии, представлявшейся отличительным признаком в действиях кумано-кипчакских племен на Балканах в конце XII – первой половине XIII века. Автор стремится ответить на вопрос, какие факторы обусловливали неизменную поддержку куманами недавно созданной Второй болгарской империи против различных противников, таких как Византия, Латинская империя Константинополя и королевство Венгрии.
Материалы исследования: настоящая статья основывается на разнообразных источниках. Сведения первостепенной важности для анализа кумано-кипчакской деятельности на Балканах предоставляют византийские летописи, а также латинские и французские источники о крестьянах на Балканах. В качестве сравнительного материала были использованы сведения о куманах, содержащиеся в летописях Руси, персидских летописях и других исламских источниках. Несмотря на разнообразный характер, все эти источники имеют одну общую особенность: они не фокусировались на истории кумано-кипчаков в своем повествовании и обычно касались ее только в том случае, когда кочевники оказывались вовлечены в дела своих оседлых соседей. Таким образом, отображение кумано-кипчакской деятельности в определенном регионе вообще (и в частности на Балканах) неизбежно является фрагментарным и неполным не только на страницах отдельных хроник, но и в рамках всех средневековых историографических традиций, к которым они относятся. Вследствие этого здесь используется сравнительный подход к неоднородным источникам для проведения исчерпывающего анализа кумано-кипчакского присутствия на Балканах.

Новизна исследования: настоящая статья впервые идентифицирует и дает определение феномену болгарофилии, выказываемой куманами в их деятельности на Балканах в конце XII – первой половине XIII веке. Данная работа также является одним из первых исследований, рассматривающих присутствие куманов на Балканах в широкой сравнительной перспективе, используя дополнительные источники по истории этих кочевников в Понтийских степях, а также в Центральной Азии.

Результаты исследования: последовательная линия поддержки куманами болгарской военной активности в юго-восточной Европе не может рассматриваться следствием какой-то эмоциональной симпатии куманской элиты, а напротив, как результат сугубо объективных и материальных соображений. Болгарофилия была рассмотрена и истолкована здесь в контексте общей историографической концепции развития сбалансированных отношений между кумано-кипчаками и их оседлыми соседями.

Ключевые слова: куманы, кипчаки, Вторая болгарская империя, Балканы, Византия, Латинская империя Константинополя


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